Volume 14
Issue 2 Spring 1984
Spring 1984

Worker's Compensation - Tort - Comparative Fault Principles Do
Not Affect Negligent Employer's Right to Full Reimbursement of
Compensation Benefits out of Worker's Partial Third-Party
Recovery - Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc.
Myra F. Moldenhauer

Recommended Citation
Myra F. Moldenhauer, Worker's Compensation - Tort - Comparative Fault Principles Do Not Affect
Negligent Employer's Right to Full Reimbursement of Compensation Benefits out of Worker's Partial ThirdParty Recovery - Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc., 14 N.M. L. Rev. 437 (1984).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol14/iss2/8

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of
Law. For more information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

WORKER'S COMPENSATION-TORT-Comparative Fault Principles Do Not Affect Negligent Employer's Right to Full Reimbursement of Compensation Benefits Out of Worker's Partial Third-Party
Recovery-Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc.

I. INTRODUCTION
In Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation,Inc.,' the New Mexico Supreme

Court addressed the issue of whether an employer's right of reimbursement under §52-1-56(C) 2 of the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation
Act3 is affected by the recent adoption of pure comparative negligence 4
and the subsequent abolition of joint and several liability.' The court held
that a negligent employer, or its insurer, is entitled to full reimbursement
of compensation benefits out of the worker's third-party judgment, even
if the worker recovers only partial damages from a third-party tortfeasor
under principles of pure comparative negligence. 6 The majority reasoned
that the Workmen's Compensation Act (the "Act") is not affected by the
common-law evolution
of tort principles because it is an exclusive sta7
tutory remedy.

1. 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-56(C) (1978) provides in pertinent part:
The right of any workman... to receive payment or damages for injuries occasioned
to him by the negligence or wrong of any person other than the employer ... shall
not be affected by the Workmen's Compensation Act, but he ... shall not be allowed
to receive payment or recover damages therefor and also claim compensation from
the employer, and in such case the receipt of compensation from the employer shall
operate as an assignment to the employer [or its insurer] of any cause of action, to
the extent of payment by the employer to the workman....
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§52-1-1 to -69 (1978).
4. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 689-90, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241-42 (1981), abolished contributory
negligence as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery and adopted a standard of pure comparative
negligence whereby a plaintiff's damages are reduced in direct proportion to her fractional share of
the total negligence of all parties.
5. Taylor, 100 N.M. at 140, 667 P.2d at 447. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98
N.M. 152, 153-54, 646 P.2d 579, 580-81 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794
(1982), addressed the issue of whether one of two coRcurrent tortfeasors could be held jointly and
severally liable for the entire amount of a non-negligent plaintiff's damages, the other tortfeasor
being absent and unknown. The court stated that "U]oint and several liability is not to be retained
in our pure comparative negligence system..." and held that a defendant is not liable for an
unknown tortfeasor's proportionate share of the total damages. Id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586. For
purposes of clarity and conciseness, the phrase "pure comparative negligence," as used in this Note,
means comparative negligence without joint and several liability.
6. 100 N.M. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448.
7. Id. at 140-41, 667 P.2d at 447-48. The court specifically cited N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-1-8
(1978), which provides in pertinent part:
Any employer who has complied with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act ... relating to insurance ....
shall not be subject to any other liability
whatsoever for the death of or personal injury to any employee, except as provided
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This Note reviews the courts' prior statutory construction of §52-156(C) under joint and several liability. After comparing the majority and
dissenting opinions, the Note analyzes the results of the holding and
explores judicial and statutory alternatives.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Taylor was injured on June 25, 1980, while working on a
portable "water tank-dog-house" unit, manufactured by Cooper Manufacturing Corporation. 8 Taylor's employer, Inland Drilling Company, had
purchased the unit from BMS Industries, Inc. 9 Subsequently, Inland employed Delgarno Transportation, Inc. to move the unit to a new drilling
site. 0 During the attempted move, Taylor was injured."
Taylor collected worker's compensation benefits totalling $61,279 from
Inland's insurer, Employers Insurance of Wausau. 2 Thereafter, he filed
suit against Delgarno, BMS, and Cooper. 13 Wausau intervened, seeking
reimbursement for compensation benefits paid.' 4 Following trial in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, a jury found
damages of $1,400,000 and apportioned negligence as follows: (1) Cooper
0%; (2) Taylor 5%; (3) Inland 10%; (4) BMS 35%; and (5) Delgarno
50%.' Thereafter, Taylor settled his claim against Delgarno for $510,000.16
Before entering judgment, the federal court certified to the New Mexico
Supreme Court the question of Wausau's right to full reimbursement."
in the Workmen's Compensation Act, and all causes of action, actions at law, suits
in equity and proceedings whatever, and all statutory and common-law rights and
remedies for and on account of such death of, or personal injury to, any such
employee, are hereby abolished except as provided in the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
8. 100 N.M. at 138-39, 667 P.2d at 445-46; Brief for Intervenor at 1-2, Taylor v. Delgarno
Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983).
9. 100 N.M. at 139, 667 P.2d at 446; Brief for Intervenor at 1, Taylor v. Delgamo Transportation,
Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983). There is a discrepancy between the reported opinion and
the brief as to which of the two parties, Cooper or BMS, was the manufacturer and which was the
seller.
10. 100 N.M. at 138, 667 P.2d at 445.
11. Id. at 138-39, 667 P.2d at 445-46.
12. Id. at 139, 667 P.2d at 446.
13. Id. The action against Delgarno was for negligence. The action against Cooper and BMS
was for products liability, negligent design, and failure to warn of dangers of a "water tank-doghouse"
unit.
14. Brief for Intervenor at 2-3, Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d
445 (1983).
15. 100 N.M. at 139, 667 P.2d at 446.
16. Id. In other words, Taylor agreed to accept $190,000 less than Delgarno was obligated to
pay under the verdict. See infra note 18.
17. Id. The following was the precise question certified:
Where the workman has obtained a verdict against third party [sic] tortfeasors
for a work related [sic] injury and the verdict, under comparative fault principles,
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A 3-2 majority of the New Mexico Supreme Court held that Wausau was
entitled to full reimbursement of the worker's compensation benefits paid
to Taylor. 8
Taylor argued that Inland's negligence should operate, under principles
of pure comparative negligence, to preclude reimbursement of the $61,279
in compensation benefits paid by Inland's insurer.'9 Under the approach
proposed by both Taylor and the dissent, a negligent employer, or its
insurer, could claim reimbursement only to the extent that compensation
benefits paid to the worker exceeded the employer's proportionate share
of the worker's total damages. 20 The majority disagreed.
The court agreed that the principles of pure comparative negligence
should govern only the third parties' liability to the injured worker. 2' An
includes a determination that the employer is at fault and such fault is a proximate
cause of the workman's injury,
(1) does such determination reduce or affect the employer's right to be reimbursed for amounts paid in compensation and medical benefits? and, if so;
(2) in what amount, assuming that an allocation of damages in proportion to
the employer's percentage of fault exceeds the amounts paid by the employer?
Id. at 138, 667 P.2d at 445. This was a case of first impression in New Mexico. Id.
18. Id. at 141, 143, 667 P.2d at 446, 448. Taylor's status at the time of the certification and
before judgment was entered may be summarized as follows:
Percent of
Amount

Total Damages

Total damages determined by jury

$1,400,000

100%

Reductions
Taylor's negligence (5%)
Immune employer's negligence (10%)
Delgarno settlement
Subtotal

70,000
140,000
190,000
$1,000,000

5%
10%
14%
71%

Additions
Pre-trial settlement with Cooper
Damages at the time of certification

30,000
$1,030,000

2%
73%

19. Id. at 140, 667 P.2d at 447; Brief for Plaintiff at 7, Taylor v. Delgamo Transportation, Inc.,
100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983). After final judgment and reimbursement, Taylor's net recovery
(before attorney's fees and other costs) was $968,721 or approximately 69% of the total damages
awarded by the jury.
20. 100 N.M. at 140-41, 667 P.2d at 447-48. Brief for Plaintiff at 6-7, Taylor v. Delgarno
Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983).
21. 100 N.M. at 140-41, 667 P.2d at 447-48. The Taylor court did not challenge the jury's
allocation of a percentage of the total negligence to a statutorily immune employer. Yet, the Bartlett
court had specifically declined to deal with situations where one of the tortfeasors would be immune
from liability. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 154, 646 P.2d 579, 581
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982). Therefore, the federal court's question,
as certified, presumed the answer to another question which had not been resolved in New Mexico.
Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing at 1-5, Taylor v. Delgarno
Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983). The possible impact of this issue on the
scope of the Taylor holding is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 92-104.
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employer's liability, however, is governed exclusively by the Act and
without regard to fault.22 The majority therefore reasoned that the employer's negligence is irrelevant to its statutory right of reimbursement
under § 52-1-56(C).2 3 Moreover, the majority appeared to believe that to
reduce an employer's reimbursement in proportion to its share of negligence would be tantamount to granting the worker a common-law tort
remedy against the employer, in direct contravention of the exclusivenessof-remedy provision. 24 The fact that §52-1-56(C) and its supporting case
law were promulgated prior to the adoption of pure comparative negligence was of no consequence. 25 The court cautioned that although the
Act should be construed liberally in favor of the worker, its provisions
may not be disregarded in the name of a liberal construction.26 The
majority concluded that to rule in favor of Taylor would necessitate either
ignoring the Act or holding a portion of it unconstitutional as well as
overruling numerous prior cases.27
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The Taylor holding permits principles of pure comparative negligence
to diminish the worker's third-party tort remedy, under certain circumstances, but it leaves the employer's right to reimbursement untouched.
The court justified this result on the ground that the reimbursement provision of § 52-1-56(C) is shielded from tort law by the exclusiveness-ofremedy and liability-without-fault features of the Act. The court's reasoning, however, gives inadequate consideration to several key issues.
Among these are: (1) the purposes of the exclusiveness-of-remedy and
liability-without-fault provisions of the Act; (2) the policies underlying
§ 52-1-56(C); and (3) the unavoidable interaction between §52-1-56(C)
and common-law tort principles. Consideration of each of these factors
suggests that the approach advocated by the Taylor dissent more accurately
reflects the policies underlying both the Act and pure comparative negligence.
A. Exclusiveness of Remedy and Liability Without Fault
The primary objectives of worker's compensation are as follows: (1)
to provide the worker with an expeditious and all-but-certain remedy for
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Taylor, 100 N.M. at 139, 667 P.2d at 446.
Id. at 139-40, 667 P.2d at 446-47.
See id. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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on-the-job injuries and (2) to protect the employer from unlimited liability
in tort.28 The first objective is achieved by imposing on the employer
absolute liability without fault for injuries arising out of and in the course
of a worker's employment.29 As a result, the worker need not prove
negligence or fault on the part of the employer, and the latter may not
raise the affirmative defenses formerly available under the common law.3
The second objective of worker's compensation is necessitated by
achievement of the first. It is not difficult to imagine the disastrous consequences to an employer of liability that is both absolute and unlimited.
Therefore, the worker's benefits are limited by statute to something less
than would be required to make the worker whole. 3 Yet, limiting the
worker's statutory recovery to subsistence benefits would not fully protect
the employer if the statutory remedy were not exclusive. The exclusiveness-of-remedy feature of worker's compensation serves as a vehicle to
enforce the limited-recovery provision of the Act.3 2 The Taylor court,
however, viewed exclusiveness of remedy as something more.
In the Taylor majority opinion, the emphatic language of the exclusiveness-of-remedy provision served as a limit on judicial interpretation
of §52-1-56(C) and precluded adoption of the dissent's construction of
that section. 33 Yet, nothing in the approach proposed by Taylor and embraced by the dissent would serve to abrogate the upper limits of the
employer's liability as explicitly set down in the Act.' The dissent's
approach would have merely prevented a negligent employer from recouping, under § 52-1-56(C), the limited benefits paid, to the extent that
those benefits were less than or equal to the employer's proportionate
share of the damages in a worker's third-party action.35 Thus, the dissent
was correct in stating that the exclusiveness-of-remedy provision limits
an employer's liability but does not affect the employer's right to reim28. For a complete discussion of the "typical" worker's compensation act and the policies underlying its basic features, see generally I A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §§ 1.003.40 (1982) [hereinafter cited as A. Larson]; W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 80 (4th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. Prosser].
29. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §52-1-9 (1978); Roseberry v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 70 N.M. 19,
21, 369 P.2d 403, 405 (1962).
30. Roseberry v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 70 N.M. 19, 21, 369 P.2d 403, 405 (1962). N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 52-1-8 (1978) specifically abolishes the defenses of assumption of the risk, contributory
negligence, and negligence of a fellow-servant.
31. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§52-1-41 to -50 (1978); Roseberry v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 70
N.M. 19, 21, 369 P.2d 403, 405 (1962); Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 37 N.M. 479,
486, 24 P.2d 731, 734-35 (1933); 1 A. Larson, supra note 28, at 11; W. Prosser, supra note 28,
at 531.
32. See 2A A. Larson, supra note 28, at § 65.11.
33. 100 N.M. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448.
34. Id. at 142-43, 67 P.2d at 449-50 (Payne, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 143, 667 P.2d at 450.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

bursement.36 The right to reimbursement stems solely from §52-1-56(C),
and as originally enacted, was a secondary function of that statute.37
B. The Purposes Underlying §52-1-56(C)
1. Worker's Unencumbered Third-Party Right of Action
The Legislature clearly intended that the worker who has claimed
compensation benefits not be penalized by being deprived of her opportunity to be made whole in an action against a third-party tortfeasor.3 8 In
fact, the statute begins with a provision that the worker's right to recover
damages from the third-party tortfeasor "shall not be affected by the
Workmen's Compensation Act. . .. "' Arguably, this language places
the worker's third-party tort claim outside the reach of the Act's exclusiveness-of-remedy provision.' Equally arguable is the proposition that
protection of the worker's right to be made whole, as against the thirdparty tortfeasor, was the primary objective of §52-1-56(C) as first enacted. 4' Moreover, the mechanism by which the employee could recover
her entire damages against a third party was to be found, not in the Act,
but in the then existing common-law tort principle of joint and several
liability.42 Thus, the courts could confidently assert that: (1) an employee
receiving compensation benefits has a right to sue a third-party tortfeasor
and (2) this right is for the entire amount of damages.43
2. The Employer's Right to Reimbursement
If allowed to keep both the tort damages and compensation benefits,
the worker would realize a "windfall" or double recovery." The second
half of § 52-1-56(C) therefore provides that "in such a case, the receipt
of benefits shall operate as an assignment to the employer [or its insurer]
36. Id. at 142, 667 P.2d at 449. The dissent also noted that the liability-without-fault provision
pertains only to the worker's claim for compensation benefits and not to the employer's right to
reimbursement.
37. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 51-57.
38. Reed v. Styron, 69 N.M. 262, 270, 365 P.2d 912, 917 (1961) (on motion for reh'g). Cf.
Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 37 N.M. 479, 486, 24 P.2d 731, 735 (1933) (third party
should not be protected at the expense of a worker who receives compensation benefits).
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. §52-1-56(C) (1978) (emphasis added). Cf. N.M. Stat. Ann. §52-1-6(D)
(Cum. Supp. 1983) which states in pertinent part: "Nothing in the Workmen's Compensation Act
...shall affect, or be construed to affect, in any way, the existence of, or the mode of trial of, any
claim or cause of action which the workman has against any person other than his employer.
40. See Taylor, 100 N.M. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448 (Payne, J., dissenting).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 51-57.
42. See, e.g., Herrera v. Springer Corp., 85 N.M. 6, 8, 508 P.2d 1303, 1305, rev'd on other
grounds, 85 N.M. 201, 510 P.2d 1072 (1973); Castro v. Bass, 74 N.M. 254, 258-59, 392 P.2d
668, 671 (1964).
43. Castro v. Bass, 74 N.M. 254, 257-58, 392 P.2d 668, 671 (1964).
44. Taylor, 100 N.M. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448.
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of [the third-party] cause 45of action to the extent of payment by the employer to the workman."
New Mexico courts have consistently rejected a literal interpretation
of this statutory language. 46 A partial assignment of the worker's thirdparty cause of action would split the cause of action and confuse the
issues.47 It is therefore well settled that the assignment language of the
statute creates, not a right of assignment, but a right to reimbursement
of compensation benefits paid.4 8 In this way, the cause of action remains
of reimbursement beunified in the workers, and the employer's right
4
comes operative only after the worker recovers. 1
Under joint and several liability, New Mexico courts had zealously
guarded the employer's statutory rights to tort immunity and reimbursement as against a third-party tortfeasor 5 The Taylor majority relied almost
exclusively on those cases. Yet, Taylor involved a different sort of controversy, one which required the court to balance the worker's right to
an unencumbered third-party action against the employer's right to reimbursement.
The cases that dealt with employer-employee conflicts under §52-156(C) established the following principles. First, the employer's right to
reimbursement is secondary to, and contingent on, the employee's successful third-party recovery. Second, the courts are free to construe the
amount and method of reimbursement in a manner consistent with the
purposes of the Act and principles of fundamental fairness.
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-1-56(C) (1978).
46. See, e.g., Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 37 N.M 479, 486-89, 24 P.2d 731, 73436 (1933).
47. Id. at 488, 24 P.2d at 735-36.
48. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Wueshinski, 95 N.M. 733, 734, 625 P.2d 1250, 1251
(Ct. App. 1981) (statute confers right of reimbursement; cause of action belongs to employee);
Herrera v. Springer Corp., 85 N.M. 6, 8, 508 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds,
85 N.M. 201, 510 P.2d 1072 (1973) (section 52-1-56(C) is a reimbursement statute; there is but
one cause of action in the worker).
49. See Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 37 N.M. 479, 488-89, 24 P.2d 731, 735-36
(1933). Unlike the Taylor majority, the unanimous court in Kandelin did not believe that a departure
from the literal language of the statute would necessitate striking it down or ignoring it. On the
contrary, the Kandelin court realized that a liberal construction of the statute was necessary to achieve
its legislative purposes, i.e.: (1) preservation of an unencumbered tort remedy against the third party;
(2) preservation of the expeditious worker's compensation remedy; and (3) prevention of double
recovery. Id. at 486, 24 P.2d at 734-35.
50. See, e.g., id. at 489, 24 P.2d at 736 (1933) (employer need not seek reimbursement in a
separate action against the third party; therefore, third party may not raise payment of compensation
as a partial defense to a worker's tort claim); Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 62 N.M. 38, 41,
304 P.2d 566, 568 (1956) (third party may not hold negligent employer liable for contribution as a
joint tortfeasor); Royal Indem. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 143, 353 P.2d 358,
363 (1960) (employer's negligence does not bar its right of reimbursement; therefore, third party's
liability need not be reduced to prevent double recovery by worker).
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3. Employer Reimbursement: Secondary and Subject to the
Worker's Third-Party Recovery
When balancing the interests of the worker against those of the employer under the Act, courts have followed a tradition of liberal construcof the Act
tion in favor of the worker5 with the caveat that provisions
2 In Brown v.
may not be ignored in the name of a liberal construction.
Arapahoe Drilling Company,5 3 the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected
an employer's argument that a worker's unsuccessful attempt to recover
third-party damages was a bar to any subsequent claim for compensation
benefits because the worker's failure to recover had deprived the employer
of the right of reimbursement. 4 The court was quick to set straight this
attempted reversal in priorities under §52-1-56(C): "[T~he right to [reimbursement] is not such a right as should operate to destroy the benefits
of the Workmen's Compensation statute. . . .The purpose of our statute
is to protect the workman. . . .The intent of the [reimbursement provision] is to prevent double recovery, not to preclude any recovery at
all.
The Brown court specifically relied on the principle set forth in Reed
v. Styron, that the right to reimbursement follows, but56 does not precede,
the employee's successful recovery from a third party. Thus, under joint
and several liability, the courts consistently treated the reimbursement
provision of § 52-1-56(C) as secondary and subject to the worker's right
to an unencumbered third-party action under the statute.
",51

4. The Amount of Reimbursement Under § 52-1-56(C): A Liberal
Construction in Favor of the Worker
v. Styron,5" the court considered whether an employer must
Reed
In
be reimbursed for attorney's fees awarded to an employee in the latter's
51. See Glover v. Sherman Power Tongs, 94 N.M. 587, 590, 613 P.2d 729, 732 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980); Transport Indem. Co. v. Garcia, 89 N.M. 342,
345, 552 P.2d 473, 476 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621 (1976) (citing Schiller
v. Southwest Air Rangers, 87 N.M. 476, 535 P.2d 1327 (1975)); Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v.
Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 295, 540 P.2d 222, 225 (1975).
52. See Transport Indem. Co. v. Garcia, 89 N.M. 342, 345, 552 P.2d 473, 476 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621 (1976) (citing Graham v. Wheeler, 77 N.M. 455, 423 P.2d 980
(1967)).
53. 70 N.M. 99, 370 P.2d 816 (1962).
54. Id. at 103-04, 370 P.2d at 819-20.
55. Id. at 104-05, 370 P.2d at 820. The court used the words "reimbursement" and "indemnity"
interchangeably.
56. Id. (citing Reed v. Styron, 69 N.M. 262, 267, 365 P.2d 912, 915 (1961) (on motion for
reh'g)).
57. See, e.g., Herrera v. Springer Corp., 85 N.M. 6, 10, 508 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Ct. App.), rev'd
on other grounds, 85 N.M. 201, 510 P.2d 1072 (1973) (result of worker's third-party litigation
controls employer's fight-to reimbursement); Transport Indem. Co. v. Garcia, 89 N.M. 342, 345,
552 P.2d 473, 476 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621 (1976) (section 52-1-56(C)
creates, between the worker and employer, a conditional debtor-creditor relationship which becomes
operative only if a third party recovery is made by the worker).
58. 69 N.M. 262, 365 P.2d 912 (1961) (on motion for reh'g).
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original claim against the employer for compensation benefits. 59 The court
noted that the Legislature, in enacting § 52-1-56(C), intended to avoid
penalizing the employee who had received worker's compensation benefits.' The Act carefully protects the injured worker from payment of
attorney's fees under certain circumstances.6" Moreover, reimbursement
of those fees would diminish the worker's third-party recovery.62 The

court therefore held that compensation benefits, in the form of attorney's
63
fees, are not reimbursable under § 52-1-56(C).
The New Mexico Court of Appeals carried this reasoning one step
further in Transport Indemnity Company v. Garcia.' In that case, the
employer's compensation carrier brought action against an employee for
reimbursement of compensation benefits out of the employee's third-party
judgment.65 The employee counterclaimed for a proportionate share of
his attorney's fees and other costs of litigating the third-party suit. 66 The
court upheld the worker's successful counterclaim based in part on the
following reasoning: (1) worker's compensation benefits are not comparable to normal tort recovery; 67 (2) Workmen's Compensation Acts are
to be construed liberally in favor of the worker; 68 and (3) where no
guidance is given, fundamental fairness must be the guideline. 69 The court
reasoned that, because the worker bore the burden and risk of the thirdparty litigation, it would be unfair to the worker and would unjustly
enrich the insurer to allow the employer to benefit from the third-party
action without sharing in the cost.7"
Both TransportIndemnity and Reed demonstrate that courts may adjust
the amount of reimbursement in a manner consistent with the purposes
underlying the Act. Under joint and several liability, §52-1-56(C) operated to make the worker whole, and the reimbursement provision served
only to prevent double recovery.7" Thus, as between the worker and
employer, the interaction between the tort law and statutory remedy was
never a problem. Yet, the adoption of pure comparative negligence, as
interpreted by the Taylor court, has necessarily altered the operation of
§ 52-1-56(C).
59. Id. at 268, 365 P.2d at 915. Unlike § 52-1-56(C), the predecessor statute construed in Reed
contained no specific listing of reimbursable benefits. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-25 (1953).
60. 69 N.M. at 270, 365 P.2d at 917.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 89 N.M. 342, 552 P.2d 473 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 9, 558 P.2d 621 (1976).
65. 89 N.M. at 343, 552 P.2d at 474.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 345, 552 P.2d at 476.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
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C. The Interaction Between Tort Law and §52-1-56(C): The Effect of
Comparative Negligence
In Taylor's case, the jury's allocation of a portion of the total negligence
to the statutorily immune employer precluded complete recovery against
the third-party tortfeasors. 72 The New Mexico Supreme Court did not
analyze or justify this result. Instead, it summarily affirmed the holding
in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,72a that joint and several
liability is not to be retained by the adoption of pure comparative negligence. 73 The Taylor majority did not discuss the possibilities for "double
recovery" under § 52-1-56(C) absent joint and several liability. It simply
stated that "[a]lthough a jury may apportion liability to an employer
under the 'pure' comparative negligence standard, none of this apportioned negligence shall reduce the employer's right of reimbursement,
regardless of the jury's finding. "" The dissenting opinion, however, dealt
in more detail with the interdependence between the statute and tort law.
As pointed out in the dissent, Under principles of pure comparative
negligence, a worker will realize a double recovery under §52-1-56(C)
only if the jury assesses no negligence to the employer or if the employer
has paid worker's compensation benefits in an amount exceeding its
proportionate share of fault as assessed by the fact finder.75 The dissent
reiterated the principle that the Act is to be construed liberally to achieve
its benevolent purpose and assure the worker the full measure of her
exclusive statutory remedy.76 That Inland's comparative negligence had
operated to deny Taylor a full recovery of damages was, in the dissent's
view, unavoidable. 77 Nonetheless, to further reduce Taylor's recovery by
requiring him to reimburse Inland would be to allow a negligent employer
to escape even the limited liability of the workmen's compensation statute.
The employer would thus realize a windfall at the employee's expense. 78
Such a result, in the dissent's opinion, was clearly contrary to legislative
intent.79
D. The Effect of Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc.
The rule in Taylor has laid the foundation for some unjust-and even
absurd-results under § 52-1-56(C), of which the outcome in Taylor is
only one example. The worker's position is compromised most severely
72. 100 N.M.
72a. 98 N.M.
73. Id. at 140,
74. Id. at 141,
75. 100 N.M.
76. Id. at 143,
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.

at 142, 667 P.2d at 449.
152, 646 P.2d 570 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982.).
667 P.2d at 447.
667 P.2d at 448 (emphasis in original). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
at 142, 667 P.2d at 449 (Payne, J.,dissenting).
667 P.2d at 450.
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where the employer's proportionate negligence exceeds that of the thirdparty tortfeasor and the total damages assessed exceed the amount of
compensation benefits to which the worker is entitled. Assume, for example, damages of $100,000 and compensation benefits of $5,000. If
the employer is found to be 97% negligent and the third party 3% negligent, the worker will recover $3,000 from the third party only to turn
the entire amount over to the negligent employer or its insurer. Under
such circumstances, the worker's right to be "made whole" in a thirdparty action is not merely diminished but eliminated entirely.
Nor can the worker take comfort in the fact that she may simply do
nothing with respect to her third-party right of action. In Continental
Casualty Co. v. Wueshinski,8 ° the court of appeals upheld a worker's
compensation carrier's attempt to name a worker as an involuntary plaintiff in the carrier's action against the third party for reimbursement of
compensation benefits. 8' The court noted that the employee is an indispensable party to a third-party tort suit. 2 The central objectives of statutes
like §52-1-56(C) are to assure that: (1) the third party pays the same
damages as he would if there were no worker's compensation involved
and (2) the employer comes out even, with the worker receiving any
excess of the damage recovery over compensation paid.83 To accomplish
this objective, both the worker and the insurance carrier must be offered
an opportunity to press the damage suit unless the other neglects to do
so. 84 Therefore, failure to require the worker to be an involuntary plaintiff
would be unjust because it would deprive the insurer of its right to
reimbursement.85
Taken together, Wueshinski and Taylor have "turned §52-1-56(C) on
its head." 86 The secondary reimbursement provision, enacted solely to
prevent double recovery, has become the primary focus of the statute,
and pure comparative negligence has become the enemy of the worker's
compensation beneficiary whose injury involves the negligence of a third
7

party.8

80. 95 N.M. 733, 625 P.2d 1250 (Ct. App. 1981).
81. Id. at 736, 625 P.2d at 1253.
82. Id. at 734, 625 P.2d at 1251. There is only one cause of action against the third party and
that action belongs to the worker. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
83. Id.at 735, 625 P.2d at 1252 (citing 2A A. Larson, supra note 28, at § 74.16). But note that
Larson assumes the existence of joint and several liability which would make the worker whole.
See id. §71.10-20 (1983).
84. Id.
85. 95 N.M. at 736, 625 P.2d at 1253.
86. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing at 11-12, 14-17,
Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983).
87. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing, at 16-17; Brief for
Plaintiff on Motion for Rehearing at 10, Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138,
667 P.2d 445 (1983).
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Such a result is particularly ironic when one considers that worker's
compensation and comparative negligence share a common origin.88 Although comparative negligence is a more recent development, it, no less
that worker's compensation, arose in response to the harshness of the
common-law defenses that shielded industries from tort liability during
the industrial revolution. 89 That comparative negligence should now operate to frustrate the beneficent purposes of the Act by means of "hypertechnical refinements of its meaning" ' is difficult to comprehend.
E. Alternatives to the Holding in Taylor
The New Mexico Supreme Court has specifically rejected the option
of judicially adjusting the amount of reimbursement due a negligent employer in proportion to the employer's allocated percentage of negligence. 91 Instead, the court has explicitly left to the Legislature the task
of realigning § 52-1-56(C) with current common-law tort principles. 92 A
third alternative may, however, be available.
1. One Remaining Judicial Alternative
The court of appeals, in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,93
explicitly stated "we do not consider situations where one of the tortfeasors would not be subject to any liability; such situations might arise
under either statutory or common-law provisions." 94 Moreover, the issue
of whether the negligence of a statutorily immune employer should be
included in the total calculus of liability in a worker's third-party tort
action was neither briefed nor argued in Taylor. Rather, the inclusion of
Inland's negligence was presented to the supreme court as a fait accompli. 9

Arguably, the appellate court chose not to prolong litigation by refusing
to allow the jury verdict to stand, especially because the parties did not
raise the issue of whether Inland's negligence was properly included. If
such is the case, Taylor may be regarded as a sport, limited to its own
particular facts and procedural history. Thus, New Mexico courts might
88. See generally I A. Larson, supra note 28, at §§4.00-5.30 (1982); W. Prosser, supra note
28, at §§67, 80.
89. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 688, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241 (1981); Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810-13, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-32, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 862-63 (1975); 1
A. Larson, supra note 28, at §§4.00-5.30; W. Prosser, supra note 28, at §§67, 80.
90. Glover v. Sherman Power Tongs, 94 N.M. 587, 590, 613 P.2d 729, 732 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 94 N.M. 675, 615 P.2d 992 (1980).
91. Taylor, 100 N.M. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448.
92. Id.
93. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 570 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
94. Id. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581 (citing, inter alia, Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 62 N.M.
38, 304 P.2d 566 (1956)). See supra note 21.
95. See Taylor, 100 N.M. at 138-39, 667 P.2d a: 445-46.
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be open to a different approach wherein an employer's negligence is not
considered in an employee's third-party action.
The result of such an approach would be to distribute the employer's
share of liability among all other negligent parties before the court. First,
the jury would determine the total damages incurred by the worker. Then,
the total negligence or fault would be apportioned only among the worker
and third parties. In this way, the sole barrier to a worker's full recovery
in a third-party action would be the worker's own negligence. The employer's right of reimbursement would be relegated to its original and
secondary function of preventing double recovery, and the conflict between the employee's and employer's rights under § 52-1-56(C), created
by Taylor, would disappear. Finally, this approach would preclude any
inquiry into the employer's negligence, thus preserving the "purity" of
the exclusiveness-of-remedy and liability-without-fault provisions so important to the Taylor majority.
It may be argued that such an approach is unfair to the third-party
tortfeasor, especially where the employer's negligence was, in fact, greater
than that of the third party and the worker's negligence was minimal or
nonexistent. For example, a third party who was only 3% negligent would,
in the absence of employee negligence, be liable for 100% of the worker's
damages. Such a result is prima facie inconsistent with principles of pure
comparative negligence. It represents a virtual return to the principle of
joint and several liability, wherein the third party was made an involuntary
insurer of the employer.96
Nonetheless, where work-related injuries are concerned, the problem
of loss distribution is ultimately one of public policy.97 Even under joint
and several liability, the relief available under the Joint Tortfeasor's Act
was denied to a third party whose negligence had concurred with that of
an employer in causing a worker's injury.98 If the employer is to be
shielded from all tort liability whatsoever, and also retain an absolute
right to full reimbursement of compensation benefits, the burden of the
worker's loss must fall on either the worker or the third party or both.
In many instances the third party is in a better position to bear the burden
(or pass it on to the consumer) than the worker. Even so, principles of
pure comparative negligence would, under this alternative approach, assure that the worker and third party would each share the burden in
proportion to their relative negligence."
96. See Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 142-43, 145, 353
P.2d 358, 361-62, 364 (1960).
97. See I A. Larson, supra note 28, at § 2.20; 2AA. Larson, supra note 28, at §71.10.
98. See Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 142-43, 353 P.2d
358, 361-62 (1960); Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 62 N.M. 38, 41, 304 P.2d 566, 568 (1956).
99. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 684, 688, 634 P.2d 1234, 1236, 1240 (1981).
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One final caveat is in order. The trend in New Mexico decisions has
been to include the negligence of all actors in the total calculus of fault
when determining the proportionate liability of parties before the court.
Thus far, the court of appeals has allowed juries to consider the negligence
of the following persons: (1) an absent and unknown tortfeasor,' ° (2) a
tortfeasor who had settled before a trial,"'0 and (3) a relative of the plaintiff
who was not a party to the suit. 0 2 If this trend continues, and the courts
remain unmoved by the special policy considerations underlying worker's
compensation, the worker's only hope for regaining an unencumbered
third-party right of action rests with the Legislature.
2. Two Simple Legislative Alternatives
The Legislature could easily restore the original function of §52-156(C) by either changing the tort law as it relates to the statute or changing
the wording of the statute itself. The lawmakers need only add to the Act
a provision that, in a worker's third-party tort action, the negligence of
the employer is not to be considered by the jury when apportioning fault
to the parties. " The advantages and disadvantages of this approach already have been discussed.
Another approach would be to replace the assignment language of §521-56(C) with a provision that, where a worker recovers damages in tort
against a third party, the worker must reimburse any compensation benefits
paid by the employer or its insurer to the extent that such benefits exceed
the proportionate share of liability, if any, allocated to the employer. 105
100. Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 159, 646 P.2d 579, 586 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
101. Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227, 232, 668 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 100
N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308 (1983).
102. Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc., 100 N.M. 313, 314, 318-19, 670 P.2d 113,
114, 118-19 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 259, 669 P.2d 735 (1983).
103. The New Mexico Court of Appeals has been asked to deal specifically with the issue of
whether the conduct of a statutorily immune tortfeasor should be considered in the total calculus of
negligence. See New Mexico Highway Dep't v. Medina, No. 7313 (N.M. Ct. App. argued Feb.
13, 1984).
104. Such a provision could easily be added as subsection D of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-56 (1978).
105. A sample statute might look something like this:
The right of any worker to receive payment or damages for injuries occasioned
to him by the negligence or wrong of any person other than the employer shall
not be affected by the Workmen's Compensation Act. But if such payment or
damages are received, the worker shall reimburse to the employer, or its insurer,
any payment by the employer to the worker for compensation, surgical, medical,
osteopathic, chiropractic and hospital services occasioned by the injury, to the
extent that such payment by the employer exceeds the proportionate share of
liability, if any, allocated to the employer by a jury or court in the third-party
action. If no negligence, fault or liability has been apportioned to the employer,
the employer shall be reimbursed in full for all such payments made.
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This approach would have several advantages. First, it would allow maximum third-party recovery without violating principles of pure comparative negligence. The third party would pay no more than its share of
the damages. Second, it would preserve the statutory limit on the employer's total liability. The worker would be "penalized" for the employer's negligence only to the extent that the employer's proportionate
share of the tort damages exceeded the statutory limit on its compensation
liability. Finally, it would prevent a negligent employer from escaping
completely its liability under the Act.
Such a statute would, however, change the nature of the employer's
participation in, or relationship to, the worker's third-party litigation.
Under the present system, an employer, or its insurer, need only intervene
in the worker's third-party action for the purpose of assuring that reimbursement will occur. The amount of reimbursement is, in theory, not an
issue. 1" Under the new statute, the employer or its insurer would need
to participate more actively in the trial to prove that the employer was
not negligent and was therefore entitled to full reimbursement of benefits
paid to the worker. The employer would, in fact, be subjected to a limited
quasi-tort liability.
Nonetheless, the interaction of tort law and §52-1-56(C) is unavoidable, and as previously mentioned, the mode of operation of the statute
is ultimately a question of public policy. The Act was promulgated to
protect both the worker and the employer. Under joint and several liability,
§52-1-56(C) struck a balance between the interests of the worker and the
employer at the expense of the third-party tortfeasor. The adoption of
pure comparative negligence has altered that balance in favor of the third
party and against the worker. In addition, the Taylor court's refusal to
apply pure comparative negligence to the reimbursement provision has
further upset the balance in favor of the employer and against the worker.
Moreover, the Taylor holding is contrary to pure comparative negligence,
in that a negligent employer may escape all liability whatsoever. If the
beneficent purposes of the Act and the principle of fundamental fairness
inherent in pure comparative negligence are to be preserved, subjecting
the employer to a limited, quasi-tort liability seems a small price to pay.
The only other alternatives are to shift liability for the employer's negligence to both the worker and third party, as suggested previously, or to
leave the worker with a limited and often meaningless third-party right
of action under §52-1-56(C).
106. Under the present system, it is settled that the employer will be reimbursed in full for
payment made to the worker for medical expenses and subsistence less a proportionate share of the
cost of the third-party litigation. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49, 59-71.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation,Inc. appears to be part of a trend
toward reversing the priority of the third-party tort remedy and reimbursement provisions of §52-1-56(C). In Taylor, the court applied the
principles of comparative negligence unevenly. While allowing the tort
law to diminish the worker's third-party damages, the court refused to
alter the employer's right of reimbursement out of those damages based
on its comparative negligence. It is hoped that New Mexico's courts will,
in the future, give more thorough consideration to whether an employer's
negligence is properly considered in an employee's action against a thirdparty tortfeasor. Absent action by the courts, the worker's compensation
beneficiary is left to the initiative of the Legislature for protection of her
rights under §52-1-56(C).
MYRA F. MOLDENHAUER

